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In the event of bad weather, this event will be held in Ballroom CD.
Please visit our exhibitors tonight through Thursday evening! Research on network intrusion detection has produced a number of interesting results. In this paper, I look back to the NetSTAT system, which was presented at ACSAC in 1998. In addition to describing the original system, I discuss some historical context, with reference to well-known evaluation efforts and to the evolution of network intrusion detection into a broader field that includes malware detection and the analysis of malicious behavior. In the past year, there has been significant interest in promoting the idea of applying scientific principles to information security. The main point made by information security professionals who brief at conferences seems to be that our field of information security is finally mature enough to begin making significant strides towards applying the scientific approach. Audiences everywhere enthusiastically agree and thrash themselves for bypassing science all along, bemoaning the fact that we could be "so much further along" if we only did science. Of course, after the presentation is over, everyone goes back to the methods that have been used throughout our generation to generate prototypes and tools with no regard for the scientific principles involved. We explore the barriers to adopting a scientific approach to experimental information security projects, including:
• time to publish as a primary driver
• standard of peer reviews in conferences and journals
• expectation of a breakthrough in every publication
Based on these factors, we examine a way forward -how the scientific method can allow us to understand the underlying causality of information security and addressing the problem at its most fundamental level, and the changes in attitudes and processes necessary for this to happen. LAW has provided a forum for vital exchange, as well as a maturing source of information, focused on key issues relating to the effective and efficient modular construction and certification of assured systems from assured components. It is widely recognized that such an approach is the most promising way to achieve diverse and flexible systems that can be certified quickly and cost effectively. LAW is concerned with the theoretical, engineering, and certification challenges to be met before this goal can be fully realized.
The Workshop concerns itself with the fundamental problems of "compositional assurance" and with a need for principles, methods, and techniques that can be applied to achieve the assurance necessary for security-critical, safety-critical, and mission-critical components and systems.
For the past three years, the Layered Assurance Workshop has grown and evolved. The first LAW in 2007 took an exploratory approach, relying heavily on the participants' input to establish the agenda. The second LAW in 2008 was attended by approximately 80 individuals representing more than 30 distinct organizations. In that Workshop more of the program was established in advance, with several keynote talks chosen from responses to an open invitation, followed by breakout sessions on diverse topics. The third LAW comprised two thematic days with a common structure: morning keynote talks, afternoon panels and breakout sessions. The theme of the first day was programmatic needs of government, while that of the second day was research and development on the problems of layered assurance.
This year, the fourth LAW will include talks by distinguished speakers, panels, discussions and technical training. Attendees are encouraged to participate in AC-SAC in addition to LAW. The conjunction of LAW and ACSAC provides increased opportunities for academic and industry participants to contribute in the forum of their choice. Please pass along information about LAW to colleagues who may be interested.
The workshop is unclassified and will be open to all attendees. As a result of the transition to make LAW a permanent ACSAC workshop, there is now a LAW registration fee. This year, to ease the transition for at- The explosion in the use of the Internet over the last 10 years has connected institutions governments, researchers, and non-technical people throughout the world. The large number of devices connected to the networks has changed the Internet from a set of networks connecting computers to a set of networks connecting all types of objects. This trend, combined with the rise of collaborative technologies, virtual worlds, and cloud computing raises issues profoundly affecting how the management of systems, of computation, and of data is viewed.
A key issue that springs from the implications of managing the interconnection of people and devices throughout the world is how differing laws, customs, and world views have led to the application of technologies to meet goals that conflict, yet must interoperate. For example, the rules governing privacy vary throughout the world. However, with the advent of cloud computing it may no longer be possible to restrict data to jurisdictions with compatible rules because the cloud provider may migrate data or computation to leverage resources in other jurisdictions. How do we handle this situation technologically? How do we devise policies and processes to control the effects of this increasing interconnection, the technology, and the data? What implications does this have for laws, regulations, customs, and management?
The goal of this workshop is to explore these issues in a variety of contexts. We invited original position and research papers describing the challenges that must be resolved, policies, processes and technologies that may prove useful in dealing with these problems, security, technological, societal, and legal issues, as well as aspects of computing and managing data in a world of fragmented and incompatible rules. CyberCIEGE is a 3D video game that enhances computer network security education and training through constructive resource management techniques such as those employed in the Tycoon games. In the Cyber-CIEGE world, players spend virtual money to operate and defend networks, and can watch the consequences of their choices, while under attack. CyberCIEGE scenarios cover network management and defense including the use of network filters, VPNs, e-mail encryption, access control mechanisms, biometrics, and PKI. Players balance budget, productivity, and security by keeping the virtual world's personnel happy (e.g., by providing Internet access) while protecting assets from vandals and professional attacks. The tutorial will cover the use of the game for education and training, and will include hands on scenario play for the audience. In addition, the tutorial will cover use of the Scenario Development Kit for creating and customizing scenarios.
While CyberCIEGE includes a set of "training and awareness" scenarios for general audiences (such as those of other computer security games like "Anti-phishing Phil"), the primary purpose of the game is broader computer security education. CyberCIEGE is built around the fundamental concepts of information security policies. Attacks are fueled by attacker motives. And motives vary by asset and scenario. The fidelity of CyberCIEGE attacks is high enough to illustrate functions of technical protection mechanisms and configurationrelated vulnerabilities. For example, an attack might occur because a particular firewall port is left open and a specific component lacks a suitable patch management policy. This attack engine is coupled with an economy engine that measures the virtual user's ability to achieve goals (i.e., read or write assets). This combination enables scenarios that illustrate real-world trade-offs such as the use of air-gaps vs. the risks of cross domain solutions when accessing assets on both sensitive and unclassified networks.
CyberCIEGE was created by the Naval Postgraduate School in partnership with Rivermind Inc., and it is deployed around the world in universities, community colleges and government organizations. The US Government has unlimited use of the game, and a no-cost license to use CyberCIEGE is available to educational institutions, and hundreds of such institutions have requested the game. The target audience of the tutorial is computer security instructors and those developing security training and education programs. This half day tutorial is intended to provide an overview of the state of practice in intrusion detection. It is intended to provide an understanding of the problems and potential pitfalls for researchers intending to undertake research efforts in the field, especially those who approach it from the viewpoint of other disciplines such as machine learning. The intended audience includes graduate students seeking PhD or MS topics, network security analysts who want deeper insights into the reasons why intrusion detection systems manifest relatively poor performance, and individuals desiring to evaluate intrusion detection products.
At the completion of the tutorial, the student should be conversant with the vocabulary of intrusion detection and have developed an appreciation for the difficulty of the problem area. The tutorial will cover the major classes of intrusion detection including host and network based classifications and signature and anomaly based classifications. Each of these approaches presents its own advantages and problems and each presents specific kinds of problems that need to be addressed by the research and operational communities. While there is a large body of published research in the area, relatively few of the academically developed approaches make any practical impact on the field and a unifying theme of the tutorial will be discussion of why this is the case. Specific topics of interest include the role of intrusion detection in system defense, sensing approaches, detection issues, and intrusion detection system evaluation. Abstract. In this tutorial we will describe techniques for software protection. These are techniques for protecting secrets contained in computer programs from being discovered, modified, or redistributed. Important applications include protecting against software piracy, license check tampering, and cheating in on-line multiplayer games. With a series of interactive exercises and problems, you will get hands-on experience with methods you can use to protect your program as well as techniques that attackers use to analyze and crack applications. The attack model is very liberal: we assume that an adversary can study our program's code (maybe first disassembling or decompiling it), execute it to study its behavior (perhaps using a debugger), or alter it to make it do something different than what we intended (such as bypassing a license check). In a typical defense scenario we use code transformation techniques to add confusion to our code to make it more difficult to analyze (statically or dynamically), tamperprotection to prevent modification, and watermarking to assert our intellectual property rights (by embedding a hidden copyright notice or unique customer identifier).
Background. Software protection is a fairly new branch of computer security. It's a field that borrows techniques not only from computer security, but also from many other areas of Computer Science such as cryptography, steganography, media watermarking, software metrics, reverse engineering, and compiler optimization. The problems we work on are different from other branches of computer security: we are concerned with protecting the secrets contained within computer programs. We use the word secrets loosely, but the techniques we present in this tutorial (code obfuscation, software watermarking and fingerprinting, tamper-proofing, and birthmarking) are typically used to prevent others from exploiting the intellectual effort invested in producing a piece of software.
For example, software fingerprinting can be used to trace software pirates, code obfuscation can be used to make it more difficult to reverse engineer a program, and tamperproofing can make it harder for a hacker to remove a license check. Within the discipline of systems engineering, information systems security engineering (ISSE) applies information assurance principles across a system's life cycle. Grounded by underlying security principles and a rigorous methodology, ISSE follows the "system thinking" approach for assessing system security behaviors based on dependencies, interactions and emergent properties of its components in the context of a larger system.
This tutorial aims to provide attendees with an overview of the ISSE methodologies and processes for the design, implementation and assessment of risk-based security solutions. Concepts and practices of information systems security engineering are presented from a system life cycle perspective. Core topics include security requirement engineering, architecture and design analysis, system implementation assessment, requirements/ implementation traceability correspondence, security test and evaluation strategy, and risk management. These topics are structured to follow the NIST risk management framework. In each stage of the system development life cycle, the roles and responsibilities of the ISSE team are explained.
Through the tutorial, attendees will understand the importance of capturing user's needs in a tractable form to guide development and risk analysis activities. They will be familiar with the properties used to evaluate different security architectures, the inherent trust problems relating to the composition of systems and components, and security issues associated with the adaptation of existing systems to meet the need for technological and environmental evolution.
Outline
Introduction to Information Systems Security
Engineering. This module presents an overview of the following ISSE activities in a system development life cycle: (1) Discover Information Protection Needs; (2) Define System Security Requirements; (3) Design System Security Architecture; (4) Develop Detailed Security Design;
(5) Implement System Security. This module also explores the Risk Management Framework defined by NIST and reviews ISSE responsibilities in the risk management cycle of a system to assess the effectiveness and residual risk of the system's protection mechanisms.
2. Life Cycle Assurance Practices. This module emphasizes the "baked in" security strategy and the notions of defense in breadth and defense in depth. Topics to be covered include: (1) Defense in breadth: evaluating risk throughout a system's life cycle; (2) Defense in depth: protecting against attacks by employing appropriate protection mechanisms in keys areas; (3) Trust relationships among components in large/complex systems: composition, balanced assurance, interconnection.
3. Security Requirement Engineering. This module presents a general security requirements engineering framework that includes the following activities: (1) Security requirements elicitation; (2) Threat/risk analysis; (3) Security requirements derivation; (4) Security requirements validation.
4. Security Architecture and Design. This module focuses on the following: (1) Architectural properties and strategies for reasoning about the security architecture of a system; (2) Security design requirements and engineering activities for developing and analyzing the security design for a secure system.
Prerequisites. It is assumed that participants have knowledge of basic security concepts and principles, and an understanding of computer, software and network security fundamentals. In addition, familiarity with system life cycle assurance (including threat characterization and risk analysis) and general systems engineering processes would be useful.
About the Instructor. Ms. Thuy D. Nguyen is a Senior Research Associate of Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. She has 25 years of experience and specializes in high assurance software and systems development, security evaluation and information systems security engineering. Ms. Nguyen performs research on high assurance platforms, trusted operating systems and separation kernels, secure collaborative applications, MLS federated architectures and dynamic security services. She is the lead architect/engineer of the MYSEA multilevel secure (MLS) project and oversees the construction of a MLS testbed. She co-authored a Common Criteria Protection Profile for highly robust separation kernels and a draft Computing Platform Architecture and Security Criteria for the High Assurance Platform Program. She has developed and taught courses on security requirements engineering and applied information systems security engineering. Prior to NPS, she developed commercial security products, including a TCSEC Class A1 security kernel. In recent years, virtualization has become one of the most deployed technologies in the IT field. It provides clear benefits when it comes to utilization, maintenance, redundancy and lower power consumption. However, just like every new technology, virtualization is still evolving and there are still unanswered security questions. Virtualization is a concept that encompasses many types of technologies used in different configurations and for a variety of reasons. Each one of these technologies presents its own unique sets of security challenges and benefits.
This tutorial will provide a basic understanding of the various virtualization technologies and discuss the security aspects and characteristics of each one. It will provide the audience with valuable material on how to utilize virtualization to decrease risks from security attacks and how to avoid vulnerabilities that may accompany virtualization technologies. 2. Server Virtualization Security: A detailed discussion focused on server virtualization and the underlying security benefits and challenges. The discussion will cover bare-metal (monolithic vs. microkernel) and hosted technologies.
3. Client Virtualization Security: A detailed discussion focused on client virtualization and the underlying security benefits and challenges. The discussion will cover desktop (local and hosted) and application (local and hosted) virtualization technologies.
Other Virtualization Technologies:
Other evolving virtualization technologies including OS Steaming and Workspace Virtualization and the security implications that accompany them.
Prerequisites. General understanding of computer architecture and basic security concepts.
About the Instructor. Mr. Zed Abbadi is an Application Security Manager with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). He has over 18 years of experience in software and security engineering. His experience ranges from providing security consulting services to building large-scale software systems. In his current role he is responsible for the security of all software applications that run on PCAOB's infrastructure. State of the practice courses provide an introduction and overview of the current state of research in a particular discipline with the intent of informing beginning doctoral students an overview of research, technology and outstanding problems in a particular discipline. This state of the practice tutorial describes the state of the practice in secure C language programming as defined by the C99 standard and the emerging C1X standard. The tutorial also identifies outstanding problems in these standards, and identifies where further research is necessary. The tutorial also describes The CERT C Secure Coding Standard as well as the work and progress of the WG14 C Secure Coding Guidelines study group. Prerequisites. Tutorial participants should be familiar with C language programming. Practicing C and C++ programmers will derive the greatest benefit but programmers who use other languages such as Java will also find the tutorial useful. For a long time, computer security was mainly concerned with the design of various technical mechanisms for defending against adversaries, as well as with the underlying mathematical foundations such as cryptography primitives. However, the usability of such technical mechanisms was largely ignored, which unfortunately has proved a major cause of many computer security failures. In particular, many technical solutions though theoretically sound were practically insecure because of their poor usability.
In recent years, "usable security" (or "security usability") has attracted fast growing attention in both academia and industry. More and more people agree that we need usable security systems -unusable secure systems are not used properly or at all, and thus only usable systems can provide effective security. However, there is less agreement about how to design systems that are both usable and secure.
Outline This full-day tutorial will give an overview of the field of usable security with the focus on principles, approaches and research methods of usable security. A large number of real-life examples will be used to illustrate that it is feasible to develop security solutions that are simultaneously secure and usable. With the aim to enable participants to both evaluate and produce highquality work in usable security, the tutorial is tentatively structured as follows:
1. Part 1: Fundamentals. How security has failed due to the failure of usability of security technologies. Psychological aspect of computer security, highlighting that what security engineers expect to work and what the user makes to work, can differ greatly. The contrast between theoretical and effective practical security will be highlighted. Examples of how security has failed due to usability will enable the attendee to recognize common mistakes. Early research in the field will be touched on, providing a background on motivations and an historical context for the field.
2. Part 2: Approaches and methods. Common approaches to usable security and relevant design principles for security usability will be discussed. Methods for improving security usability and methods for empirically establishing such improvement will be discussed in detail. Usability techniques successfully applied to security, including usable design (with an emphasis on error handling and task flow), lab user studies (a field advanced enough that simple and useful guidance is available in book form), field user studies, and techniques for evaluating organizational cultures. The difficulties peculiar to the usability of security will also be discussed.
Conclusions.
Prerequisites. Basic understanding of computer security. The intended audience are security researchers who want to step into the field of usable security, and security practitioners who wish to understand the impact of usable security on their work and integrate some of its lessons, techniques, and developments. PhD students and new researchers in usable security who want to have a quick start in this field will also benefit. Those who want to teach this topic can also find the tutorial relevant -a set of summary notes and a large number of pointers to further readings will be provided, so that it should be easy for them to extend the tutorial into a full course. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in collaboration with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), recently updated Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. This historic publication, for the first time, contains a unified set of security controls for both non national security and national security systems. This session provides an overview of the unified security control catalog and the security control selection process described in NIST SP 800-53, Revision 3, as well as an introduction to CNSS Instruction 1253, the publication that provides implementation guidance for the national security community using SP 800-53.
Prerequisites. None. Information technology is widely recognized as the engine that drives the U.S. economy, giving industry a competitive advantage in global markets, enabling the federal government to provide better services to its citizens, and facilitating greater productivity as a nation. Risk related to the operation and use of information systems is one of many components of organizational risk that senior leaders address as a routine part of their ongoing risk management responsibilities. Effective risk management requires that organizations operate in a highly complex and interconnected world using state-of-theart and legacy information systems systems that organizations depend upon to accomplish critical missions and to conduct important business-related functions. Special Publication 800-39 is the flagship document in the series of FISMA publications and provides a structured, yet flexible approach for managing that portion of risk resulting from the operation and use of information systems to support the missions and mission/business processes of organizations. This session will examine Special Publication 800-39 guidelines for an integrated, enterprise wide approach to managing risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the operation and use of information systems.
Prerequisites. None -Open to anyone interested in increasing their understanding of Risk Management.
